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A Lawyer's Ethical Duty to Represent
the Unpopular Client
Stephen Jones*
Now it is difficult for any man, however wise or eloquent, to
speak for himself, when fortune, reputation, happiness, life itself are in jeopardy and rest on the decision of strangers, sworn
before God to find an impartial verdict from the evidence
brought before them. Hence has arisen the honourable and necessary profession of the advocate; it is indeed a high and responsible calling; for into his keeping are entrusted the dearest
interests of other men. His responsibility is wider in its scope
than a physician's, and more direct and individual than that of a
statesman; he must be something of an actor, not indeed playing
a well-learned part before painted scenery, but fighting real battles on other men's behalf, in which at any moment surprise
may render all rehearsal and preparation futile ....
The advocate must have a quick mind, an understanding
heart, and charm of personality. For he has often to understand
another man's life-story at a moment's notice, and catch up
overnight a client's or a witness's lifelong experience in another
profession; moreover, he must have the power of expressing
himself clearly and attractively to simple people, so that they
will listen to him and understand him. He must, then, be histrionic, crafty, courageous, eloquent, quick-minded, charming,
great-hearted.
-Edward Marjoribanks1
Following an impressive term of service in World War II,
James Daniel Gilliland attended law school at Wake Forest College. Upon graduation in 1948, he returned to his native town in
Warren County, North Carolina to practice law. Not long after his
* Stephen Jones was the court-appointed lead attorney for Timothy James McVeigh,
who was charged with and convicted of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. One hundred sixty-eight known victims died, 500
were injured, and $751 million worth of property damage was inflicted. Mr. Jones is a graduate of the University of Oklahoma Law School, 1966, having completed his undergraduate
education at the University of Texas at Austin. He was admitted to the Bar in 1966. He
currently resides in Enid, Oklahoma, where he is engaged in the private practice of law.
Mr. Jones wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Alicia Carpenter, a graduate of the University of Missouri Law School, Columbia, 1996, for research in the preparation of this
essay.
1 EDWARD MARJORIBANKS, FAMOUS TRIALs OF MARSHALL HALL 9-10 (1989).
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arrival, Gilliland found himself Commander of the local American
Legion post, an officer in the Veterans of Foreign Wars, secretary
of the Lion's Club, master of the Masonic Lodge, approved for
membership in local country clubs, and solicitor in the local recorder's court. Unfortunately, his popularity quickly plummeted
following two incidents that would scar his legal career forever.
First, he was asked to expound upon and explain the landmark
Brown v. Board of Education2 decision for his fellow Lion's Club
members. He supported the Court's decision and proceeded to display his approval. Soon after, he defended eleven alleged Communists in Charlotte, North Carolina on charges of un-American
activities. The response from the residents of Warren County to
these two incidents was prompt and harsh. Gilliland was immediately stripped of both the Lion's Club and the country club memberships and his solicitor responsibilities. In addition, disbarment
proceedings were initiated against Gilliland, founded upon accusations of questionable tactics regarding two divorce cases he had
handled. The final retaliatory blow came when the North Carolina State Bar Association demanded his disbarment. Fortunately, following an appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court,
he was "awarded" a jury trial and granted an acquittal.'
The treatment of attorneys, such as James Daniel Gilliland,
has too often chilled the desire as well as the willingness of most
attorneys to accept controversial clients. The inevitable, but unfortunate, result is a compromise of the constitutional rights that
are to be guaranteed to each and every criminal defendant. In
order to curtail these consequences, and to prevent the failing of
constitutional guarantees, the American Bar Association has instituted definite and applicable stipulations to guide the conduct
of attorneys and more specifically, to emphasize and articulate
their obligations and their duties as participants in the American
judicial system.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES

It is a right which all freemen claim, and are entitled to
complain when they are hurt; they have a right publicly to remonstrate against the abuses of power in the strongest terms, to
put their neighbors upon their guard against the craft or open
violence of men in authority, and to assert with courage the
sense they have of the blessings of liberty, the value they put
upon it, and their resolution at all hazards to preserve it as one
of the greatest blessings heaven can bestow.
-Andrew Hamilton4
2 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
3 Daniel H. Pollitt, Counsel for the Unpopular Cause: The "Hazardof Being Undone,"
43 N.C. L. REv. 9, 10 (1964).
4 WiLLIAM M. KUNSTLER, THE CASE FOR COURAGE 40 (1962).
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Before analyzing the ABA's methods of safeguarding these
rights, a brief reference to the constitutional source is helpful. Initially, and most fundamentally, each defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel:5 "An accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system. Lawyers in criminal cases 'are necessities, not
luxuries. ' "6 This foundational assertion is further supported
through Justice Stevens' Cronic opinion: "Without counsel, the
right to a trial itself would be 'of little avail,' as this court has
recognized repeatedly. 'Of all the rights that an accused person
has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may
have."'7 The noble premise for this guarantee is, of course, the
quest for the truth, and the best means to achieve this end is to
discover "powerful statements on both sides of the question."8
Only the adversarial system can effectuate the search for the
truth. The alternative is a nonadversarial society whereby one being accused is the equivalent of one being convicted. If criminal
defense lawyers do not "put the government to its proof whenever
necessary or whenever the client requires it, then we are close to
those totalitarian states where accusation equals guilt or the
criminal defense lawyers are but an adjunct prosecutor expected
to make the client confess and aid in his or her rehabilitation." 9
Hence, if criminal defendants are not represented, the foundation
of the judicial system is eroded and the lawyers become the judges
of guilt or innocence by their very decision to accept or reject those
criminal clients. After all, pronounces John W. Davis, "since the
law, however, is a profession and not a trade, I conceive it to be
the duty of the lawyer, just as it is the duty of the priest or the
surgeon, to serve those who call on him unless, indeed, there is
some insuperable obstacle in the way."1 °

II.

ABA

STANDARDS

Coupled with the aforementioned constitutional guarantees,
are standards promulgated by the American Bar Association to
further ensure the defendant's right to counsel is secure. How5 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
7 Id. at 654 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932), and Walter V.
Schaefer, Federalism and State CriminalProcedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1956)).
s Id. at 655 (quoting Irving R. Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified
Counsel?, 61 A.B.A. J. 569 (1975)).
9 JOHN WELsLY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRImINAL LAWYER

§ 9:12, at 297-98 (2d ed. 1996).
10 WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S

LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN

W. DAvis 199 (1973).
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ever, the implementation of these particular standards lies in the
discretion of each respective jurisdiction. These standards can be
instituted as the law, as rules of practice, or as simple guidelines
for attorneys to look to in their everyday practice. Regardless of
their treatment in each jurisdiction, the ABA standards should
nonetheless be regarded by all attorneys as governing standards
by which to judge their conduct.
Therefore, according to ABA Defense Function Standard 41.2(a), "Counsel for the accused is an essential component of the
administration of criminal justice. A court properly constituted to
hear a criminal case must be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the judge (and jury, where appropriate), counsel for the
prosecution, and counsel for the accused." The lawyer's function,
consequently, is to present the case at law, and to leave to the
judges and the juries of the system the ultimate responsibility of
determining whether the client has acted consistently or inconsistently with our system of justice. 1 The lawyer is simply, but pivotally, "an equalizer, cutting down to legal size the man 'above the
law,' increasing the stature of the man who doesn't 'know' anybody, so that each may approach the law as an ordinary man."12

III.

THE UNPOPULAR CLIENT

The issue becomes exponentially more complicated and more
critical, though, when the defendant is one who is decidedly unpopular. When confronted with this situation, attorneys should
adhere to the standard set forth in ABA Defense Function Standard 4-1.6(b), that "all... qualified lawyers should stand ready to
undertake the defense of an accused regardless of public hostility
toward the accused or personal distaste for the offense charged or
the person of the defendant."
A.

Ethical Considerations of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility

Furthermore, the Canons of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, although referenced as "norms," nonetheless prescribe conduct that is expected of lawyers in their relationships
with the public and with the legal system. Specifically, the Model
Code stipulates "a lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available."13 This guideline is
supported by several ethical considerations, commonly referred to
ii "The function of the lawyer then is not to condemn men but to put into practice for
all of us what we have decided on as abstract principle, that no man 'be put from that he
ought to have by the law.'" DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 157 (1973).
12 Id.
13 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Canon 2 (1981).
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as "EC's," which present objectives toward which every member
should strive. The considerations also prescribe specific guidance
as to the obligation of lawyers to take on controversial or unpopular clientele. EC 2-26 states: "A lawyer is under no obligation to
act as advisor or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client; but in furtherance of the objective of the bar to
make legal services fully available, a lawyer should not lightly decline proffered employment. The fulfillment of this objective requires acceptance by a lawyer of his share of tendered
employment which may be unattractive both to him and the bar
generally."14 EC 2-27 provides further encouragement for attorneys to abide by this legal responsibility: "History is replete with
instances of distinguished and sacrificial services by lawyers who
have represented unpopular clients and causes. Regardless of his
personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is
adverse." 15 Not only is this responsibility condoned, but those attorneys who are faithful to these considerations are given the utmost esteem by members of the ABA: "[olne of the highest services
the lawyer can render to society is to appear in court on behalf of
clients whose causes are in disfavor with the general public." 6
Although accepting unpopular clients seems meritorious, the
ethical considerations of the Code imply that, essentially, there is
no realistic choice available for lawyers in these circumstances.
EC 2-29 stipulates that "when a lawyer is appointed to defend an
unpopular client by a court, a 'compelling reason' that might justify the lawyer's asking to be excused from the appointment does
not include such factors as the repugnance of the subject matter of
the proceeding, the identity or position of a person involved in the
case . . . ." Therefore, the lawyer's claim that there would be a
potential threat of "antagonizing powerful adversaries or others is
not a good reason." 7 The ethical considerations of the Model Code
address this behavior as well and warn against any attorney that
would decline employment for fear of "rocking the boat." 8
At first glance, EC 2-29 seems to be irreconcilable with EC 230, which warns that a lawyer should not accept employment "if
the intensity of his personal feeling, as distinguished from a community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a proId. at EC 2-26.
15 Id. at EC 2-27.
16 Lon L. Fuller and John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 43 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1958).
17 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 10.2, at 577 (1986).
18 EC-2-28 condemns this conduct: "The personal preference of a lawyer to avoid adversary alignment against judges, other lawyers, public officials, or influential members of
the community does not justify his rejection of tendered employment." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-28 (1981).
14
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spective client . .. "19 The distinction created between EC 2-29
and EC 2-30 is grounded upon the issue of repugnancy-essentially, if the lawyer is able to represent the client effectively, despite the repugnancy of the cause, then the attorney has no "good
reason" to decline employment. According to the Code of Professional Responsibility, the attorney now has a definite obligation to
accept the employment and to defend the rights of the unpopular
client. Mellinkoff accentuates this point-that the lawyer has one
duty that is of paramount importance regarding the unpopular client: to defend the client's rights and not to investigate or to judge
the morality of the alleged misconduct.
It is the lawyer's important task to see to it that the principle is
adhered to despite public excitement, and without regard to personal enthusiasm or hate for the particular litigant .... The
lawyer who does his duty advises by the law of the land, seeing
to it that his clients receive that measure of shelter the law says
they are entitled to. This is a large and essential assignment
...as a lawyer his expertise is law not morality, and it is the
client who must live and die with the client's conscience.2 °
While the attorney is pursuing this lofty goal of discarding his
own moral opinions of his client, he must simultaneously be exerting every effort and expending every bit of energy in pursuit of his
client's cause. This behavior is articulated appropriately in Canon
15:21
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. No fear ofjudicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.
In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any
and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of
the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense ....
Edward Bennett Williams, the famous trial lawyer, who defended the likes of Jimmy Hoffa, Senator Joe McCarthy and Frank
Costello, and who most assuredly did not allow a fear of unpopularity to discourage him from ensuring that his clients were provided with "every remedy and defense that is authorized by law,"
felt he was upholding his obligation as a criminal lawyer because
19 Id. at EC 2-30.

157 (1973).
Canon 15 was included in the original ABA Canons of Professional Ethics which
consisted of 32 rule-like Canons that were adopted by the ABA in 1908 and subsequently
supplemented and amended. The 1908 Canons are no longer enforced in their original
form in any jurisdiction, but continue to be applied through the Canons in the Model Code.
20 DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER
21
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he was protecting the disadvantaged.22 Williams illustrated
through his career the critical need for criminal defense attorneys.
He was a trailblazer in the judicial battle against unchecked police power in the 1950s and 1960s, and was given credit as the
individual who initially discovered the illegal acts of the FBI-the
acts that prompted the demise of J. Edgar Hoover.23 The criminal
defense lawyers of Williams' era also felt they were doing their
duty by upholding and defending several constitutional rights: the
6th Amendment right to counsel, the 4th Amendment freedom
from search and seizure, and the 5th Amendment right against
incrimination. Williams espoused these motives for defending the
accused in a 1957 speech given to the New York State Bar Association. Because he felt there was an epidemic of "guilt by client,"
he warned of the "insidious identification (that) would scare off
lawyers from standing by the unpopular and degraded. When a
doctor takes out Earl Browden's appendix, nobody suggests that
the doctor is a Communist. When a lawyer represents Browden
(head of the American Communist Party),
everybody decides that
24 25
lawyer must be a Communist, too."

B.

Model Rules of Professional Conduct

The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (adopted in
1983) also lend support to the cause of the unpopular client.26
Model Rule 6.2 reiterates the importance of lawyers accepting any
and all appointments. "A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause
....27 The comment to Rule 6.2 espouses: "All lawyers have a
22 "Williams held himself out as the protector of the down-trodden .... By giving the
poor all the legal protection enjoyed by the rich, a criminal defense lawyer works against
alienation and class resentment and thus fosters respect for the 'system.'" EvAN THOMAS,
THE MAN TO SEE 121 (1991).
23

Id. at 17.

Consequently, the ABA attempts to rescue the defense attorney from this erroneous
assumption through its promulgation of Model Rule 1.2(b): "A lawyer's representation of a
client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the
24

client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities."
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1994).

MODEL RULES OF PROFES-

THoMAs, THE MAN TO SEE 122 (1991).
Although the Model Rules did not enjoy the same universal acceptance as that of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, they have been adopted by approximately 75% of
25 EvAN
26

the states. JOHN WESLEY
YER 5 (1996).

HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW-

27 Good cause could consist of factors such as (a) representing the client is likely to
result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; (b) representing the
client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or (c) the client
or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 6.2 (1994).

112
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An indi-

vidual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share
of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A lawyer
may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular
clients or persons unable to afford legal services."29 While the
Code of Professional Responsibility did not attempt to establish
rules that would impose discipline or civil liability on those who
chose not to abide by them, 30 the Rules of Professional Responsibility impose disciplinary ramifications.
C.

The Duty to Rescue versus The Duty to Represent

In order to more clearly define this responsibility, duty, or obligation, owed to the unpopular client, Charles W. Wolfram, in
The Good Lawyer, draws a comparison with the duty to rescue. In
determining if there is indeed a duty to rescue, or a duty to represent, a number of considerations exist; (1) the capacity to rescueis the lawyer competent to handle the legal service which has been
asked of him?; (2) the risk to the rescuer and others-is there an
economic risk that the attorney will be taking upon acceptance of
the client?; and (3) the danger to the victim-is there a high likelihood of imminent danger?3 1 In other words, are there many other
lawyers available and willing to handle this case; if other lawyers,
for economic or morally objectionable reasons cannot accept the
employment, it would appear to increase the danger to the client.
The small likelihood that other lawyers would be available and
willing to accept a particular unpopular client creates a stronger
obligation for the attorney to accept such employment. According
to Wolfram, even though this increase in danger is created because of other lawyers' neglect of their moral duty, "the duty to
represent a necessitous client exists even when a professional regulation or custom states that there is no duty of representation. It
is the client's need, 3and
not the third-party cause of it, that gener2
ates a duty to act."
The significance of the "repugnancy" of the issue is revisited
by Wolfram, who distinguishes between this term as attached to
the client himself, or as attached to the legal right that is being
pursued. The Nazi client may be pursuing a legitimate constitutional right-the pursuit of which is not repugnant. Therefore, it
is essential to make this distinction, for the need for available and
28 See Model Rule 6.1, which provides a lawyer should aspire to render at least 50
hours of pro bono service per year.
29 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 cmt. (1994).
30 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981)
31 Charles W. Wolfram, The Good Lawyer, in A LAWYER'S DUTY To REPRESENT CLIENTS, REPUGNANT AND OTHERWISE
32 Id.

at 222.

219-22 (D. Luban ed., 1984).
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willing criminal defenders becomes crucial when there are legitimate human needs being advocated. 3 Justice Marshall, in his
concurring opinion in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 34 simply
looked at the issue from the perspective that if the client was in
need, then the obligation was present: "The obligation of all lawyers, whether or not members of an association committed to a
particular point of view, to see that legal aid is available 'where
the litigant is in need of assistance, or where important issues are
involved in the case,' has long been established."3 5
The consequence, Wolfram asserts, as a result of continual refusals by lawyers to accept unpopular clients, will be a misplacement of the "uniform judgment of lawyers in a position of veto over
the considered judgment of public officials-those who promulgated the legal right .... The resulting 'lawyers' trump' replaces
official judgments and policies with private moral ones."36 In effect, unless there is some mechanism that exists that would test
lawyers' opinions by a court of review, the resulting system would
be "informal and, arguably, illegitimate in a representational
democracy."3 7
Ultimately, the effectiveness of these constitutional guarantees is contingent upon the conduct of attorneys, and whether they
are willing to respect or whether they will neglect those guarantees. The lawyer's function is to defend the rights that are guaranteed to every American individual. The lawyer is neither
awarded, nor allowed, the luxury of determining the guilt or innocence of any client. The constitutional rights of every individual
are at risk when they are stripped from even one criminal defendant no matter how unpopular the defendant may be. If the system
allows lawyers to determine the fate of an accused by denying the
defendant the constitutional right of representation by counsel,
then the system lies precariously in unworthy and unconstitutional hands.
If the lawyer fulfills these professional responsibilities, then
the legal system has a fighting chance of securing those rights
which it purports to secure. A client pursues an attorney to defend rights, not to judge guilt or innocence, or even to weigh the
client's rights. The client is entitled to say to counsel "I want your
advocacy, not your judgment; I prefer that of the court."3 s
33 Id. at 229-31.
34 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).

35 Id. at 470.
36 Wolfram, supra note 31, at 232.
37 Id.
38 DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER

Emerson, L.R. 6 Ex. 329, 367 (1871)).

157 (1973) (quoting Johnson

v.
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The great British advocate, Norman Lord Birkett, in a remarkable series of addresses on the BBC Radio, which were then
republished by him as Six Great Advocates, 39 expressed the
following:
Many, I know, regard the law as something of a mystery, and I
am quite conscious of the prejudice against the advocate which
exists in the mind of many members of the public. I cannot hope
to remove that prejudice, but I am sure I ought to try to do so.
From the moment that I was called to the Bar I have been
brought face to face with the widespread misconception of the
true function of the advocate in our courts of law and of his place
in our way of life. There cannot be any member of the Bar who
has not been faced at some time or other with the old and familiar question: "How can you possibly defend a guilty man?" or
some question of a similar kind. Such questions were asked at
Athens in the days of Demosthenes and at Rome in the days of
Cicero and they have been asked at every stage of our legal
history.40
They were asked of me, "How could you possibly defend a man
charged with killing 168 individuals, including 19 children?"
I quite realize how strange and, indeed, wrong it must seem
to the ordinary citizen that a lawyer, who may be respected among
his fellow citizens, should defend a client whom the lawyer must
know in his heart to be guilty of the crime charged, and further to
be paid for doing so:4

"How is it possible ...

for an advocate to

resist an argument that appears to be founded on truth, and to
seek to make the worst appear the better reason?" 42 Or, to put it
quite starkly, many people believe the advocate cannot possibly be
sincere, or indeed, honest in fulfilling the conduct of his profession; for the ordinary citizen only espouses a cause because "he
believes in it, but the advocate espouses a cause because he is paid
to do so, whether he believes in it or not."43
In practice, if there are good reasons why an advocate
should not undertake a certain case, then [the lawyer] can quite
easily decline it. But, as Erskine so eloquently said, "if the advocate refuses to defend from what he may think of the charge
or the defence (sic), he assumes the character of the judge ...
and puts the heavy influence of perhaps a mistaken opinion into
the scale against the accused, in whose favour the benevolent
principles of English Law makes all presumptions."
NoRMAN BIRKETr, Six GREAT ADVOCATES (1961).
Id. at 97-98.
See generally id. at 98-99 (this paragraph and the two which follow include direct
quotes and paraphrases of Lord Birkett's book, with thoughts from the author intermixed).
42 Id. at 98.
39

40
41

43

Id.
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Still, the charge against the advocate remains and was put
into [caustic] form by that strange and erratic genius, Dean
[Jonathan] Swift, in Gulliver's Travels, when he said of the Bar
that "they were a society of men bred up from their youth in the
art of proving by words multiplied for the purpose, that white is
black and black is white according as they are paid.""
Now, the plain truth is that the advocate is not pleading, stating
or advocating personal views and indeed, has no right whatever to
do so. Indeed, lawyers are bound by very strict rules of conduct
and an equally strict code of honor, especially designed to allow
them to discharge their duties in the administration of justice
without being false to themselves or their conscience, and without
failing in their duty to the community in which they live. The
function of the advocate is to present one side of the case with all
the skill available so that the judge, or the judge and jury can compare counsel's presentation with that of the advocate on the other
side, and then decide, after full investigation, where the truth lies.
This pursuit of justice is the essence of the adversarial system.
And what is the duty of the advocate who shoulders the heavy
burden of defending a prisoner such as Mr. McVeigh on this most
horrible and gravest of all charges, involving the largest terrorist
act in American history: 168 people dead, 500 injured, and $751
million worth of damage in an act that disrupted the social fabric
of Oklahoma's capital city and for which tens of thousands otherwise have suffered emotionally, physically and financially. My
duty was to devote myself completely to this task, whatever I may
have thought of the charges, and to lay aside every other duty, so
that I could act constantly in the interest of the accused, and to
say for Tim McVeigh all that he would wish to say for himself,
were he able to do so. The purpose of this procedure in our law is
not that a guilty person shall escape, but to make certain, so far as
human fallibility can do so, that no innocent person shall suffer.
Once the defense of such an individual as Tim McVeigh has
been undertaken in a high-profile case, the interest of the media
will be aroused. In the defense of Mr. McVeigh, Chief Judge
Matsch, the trial judge, in an order 45 in the case specifically recognized the right of Mr. McVeigh's lawyers to address public issues
concerning the case. He wrote: "The Supreme Court has recognized that in circumstances such as those surrounding this case,
the function of defense counsel includes representation 'in the
' 46
court of public opinion.'
Id. at 98-99.
See Order of the Court, filed March 17, 1997, in United States v. Timothy McVeigh,
No. 96-CR-68-M, 1997 WL 117369 (D. Colo.).
46 Id. at *2 (quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991)).
44

45

116
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Judge Matsch also addressed the issue of attorney's fees and
costs in the same order:
Foundational fairness requires that the person accused has
legal counsel with the skill, competence, experience and courage
to provide him with effective representation of his interest at all
stages of the proceedings. When counsel are appointed, they
must be given adequate resources to support a separate and independent investigation, including technological tools and the
expertise of those who have relevant knowledge and experience
to assist in preparing the challenge the charges made against
the defendant .... There can be no doubt about the foundational fairness provided for the defendant in this case. He has
lead counsel who had consistently demonstrated his skill and
experience as an advocate with a complete and dedicated commitment to his professional responsibility in the representation
of Timothy McVeigh. Mr. Jones has the assistance of other capable and responsible lawyers, selected by him for particular
assignments.
Of course, this license must be exercised professionally and
appropriately. The purpose of public exposure in defending the
unpopular client is not for the lawyer to be mesmerized by the
press or to engage in self-aggrandizement or grandstanding or to
subvert the due course of justice. Rather, the lawyer's duty is to
stand as a guardian and protector of the trial rights of the accused, and ultimately the safety of the community itself, by explaining in calm, dispassionate tones in as summary a form as
possible what is factually occurring in the case. To do so, of
course, runs the risk of criticism from the media, and perhaps
others. On the one hand, if counsel appears too frequently, the
media or the public will accuse the attorney of self-promotion.
Conversely, if the lawyer fails to respond to the media's questions,
then the accusation of "hiding" will arise. One cannot please the
media, nor should one try. In the final analysis, in defending an
unpopular cause or client, the lawyer must be true to his own personal sense of honor and conscience, and professional responsibility. If the lawyer truly believes he is doing the right thing, then
he should not be anxious. The advocate needs to know, however,
that because of the rules of confidentiality he may never be able to
explain the reason for individual acts or exercises of judgment.
When I agreed to represent Mr. McVeigh, I felt it important
that a trial lawyer from the Oklahoma bar be ready to accept the
court's appointment. If no competent or experienced trial lawyer
in Oklahoma was willing to defend Mr. McVeigh, it would have
been a black mark not only against justice but against the bar
47 Id. This quote is from the portion of Judge Matsch's order relating to defense costs
that must be incurred so that defense counsel is fully prepared.
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association and ultimately our state and society. No inconsistency
exists in being a good citizen and accepting the court's
appointment.
Nor did I seek the appointment nor use it to advance my own
cause or interest. When the case was over, I returned to
Oklahoma to live, practice and work much as I did before that terrible day in April 1995, which became the standard by which all
Oklahomans measure time. In conclusion, let me quote Reverdy
Johnson:
[Bly education, character and profession (the advocates) are especially qualified by their example to influence the public sentiment of their states, and to bring those states to the complete
conviction which, it is believed, they must largely entertainthat to support and defend the Constitution of the United States
...is not only essential to their peoples' happiness and freedom,
but it is a duty to their country and their God.'

48 WILLLM M. KUNSTLER, THE CASE FOR COURAGE

156 (1962).

